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CASE NOTE
CIVIL RIGHTS—The Clock Starts Ticking: Title VII Pay Discrimination
Claims. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
Jennifer F. Kemp*

INTRODUCTION
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) employed Lilly Ledbetter
as a non-union area manager in a Gadsden, Alabama tire-production plant for
nineteen years.1 After years of suspecting Goodyear paid her less than men in her
department, an anonymous note appeared in her mailbox relating the salaries of
three of her male counterparts.2 The note prompted an investigation.3 Ledbetter
learned that although she started at the same wage as men in her position, her
current salary fell below every other male supervisor in her department, even
those hired well after her.4 At times, her pay even dipped below what Goodyear
set as the minimum pay level for the area-manager position.5
Ledbetter ﬁled a questionnaire with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in March 1998 and a formal EEOC charge in July 1998.6
Following her early retirement from Goodyear and the EEOC’s issuance of a
right to sue letter, Ledbetter ﬁled suit.7 Ledbetter presented evidence at trial that
Goodyear paid her less money than any other male supervisor at the Gadsden
location, solely because of her gender.8 The jury awarded her $3.8 million in back
pay and punitive damages.9 The trial court, however, reduced the judgment based

*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009.
1

See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007) [hereinafter
Ledbetter II].
2
Impact of Ledbetter v. Goodyear on the Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) available at http://edworkforce.house.
gov/hearings/fc061207.shtml [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Lilly Ledbetter).
3

See id.

4

See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter Ledbetter I].
5

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). By the end of 1997 Ledbetter
earned $3,727 per month, less than all other area managers in her section. Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at
1174. The lowest paid male area manager made roughly 15% more than Ledbetter; the highest paid
made roughly 40% more. Id.
6

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1175.

7

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.

8

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1175.

9

Id. at 1176. The jury awarded $223,776 in back pay, $4,662 for mental anguish, and
$3,285,979 in punitive damages. Id.
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on Title VII damage limits.10 Ledbetter’s ultimate trial court judgment amounted
to $360,000.11
Goodyear appealed the judgment, arguing that time barred Ledbetter’s claim
because according to Title VII “unlawful employment practices” must occur
within 180-days of the EEOC claim, and none of the allegedly discriminatory pay
decisions occurred within that limitations period.12 Although two performance
reviews had taken place during the 180-day charging period, Ledbetter presented
no evidence proving discriminatory intent behind those decisions.13 Ledbetter
instead argued that each paycheck issued, reﬂecting a lower wage than other
similarly situated employees, constituted a new violation, and created a new
180-day charging period.14 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit declined to follow this “paycheck accrual rule” set forth by Ledbetter and
originally articulated by the Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday.15 The Eleventh
10
Id. Title VII limits compensatory and punitive damages to $300,000 in actions against
employers with more than 500 employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D)
(2006). Additionally, because back pay may accrue no more than two years prior to the date a
charge is ﬁled with the Commission, the court awarded only $60,000 in back pay. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)-5(g)(1) (2006).
11

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1176.

12

See id. Title VII requires ﬁling of a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180-days
of the “unlawful employment practice,” or if the complainant ﬁles the charge with a state or local
agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practices, within 300 days of the “unlawful
employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1). Lilly Ledbetter lived and worked in Alabama,
where there is no state or local agency with the authority to grant relief, therefore the author will
assume a 180-day charging period for the purposes of this case note. See Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at
1178. Both Goodyear and Ledbetter agreed the ﬁling period started 180-days before the March
ﬁling. Id.
13

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1186-87.

14

Id. at 1181.

15

See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986). The EEOC and the majority of
circuit courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, applied the paycheck accrual rule until the Ledbetter
decision. See 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §2-IV-C(1)(a), p. 605:0024, n. 183 (2006) (providing
that “repeated occurrences of the same discriminatory employment action, such as discriminatory
paychecks, can be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred within the charge ﬁling
period”); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n a Title VII case claiming
discriminatory pay, the receipt of each paycheck is a continuing violation.”); Ashley v. Boyle’s
Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Madison
v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Ashley’s Title VII pay claim is timely because she
received allegedly discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the ﬁling of her administrative
charge.”); Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 349 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[P]aychecks
are to be considered continuing violations of the law when they evidence discriminatory wages.”);
Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448-49 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Contrary to
Partners’ assertions, Calloway’s wage claim is not a single violation with a continuing effect . . .
When the claim is one for discriminatory wages the violation exists every single day the employee
works.”); Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he policy of paying lower wages to female employees on each payday constitutes a
continuing violation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hall v. Ledex, Inc., 669 F.2d 397, 398
(6th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he discrimination was continuing in nature. Hall suffered a denial of equal pay
with each check she received.”).
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Circuit reasoned that because Goodyear had a system for periodically reviewing
and re-establishing employee salaries, Ledbetter could only recover if she could
prove that a discriminatory decision affecting her pay occurred within the 180day charging period.16
Ledbetter appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld
the Eleventh Circuit ruling and agreed that the statute of limitations barred
Ledbetter’s claim.17 The Court reasoned that each paycheck issued merely carried
on the “effects” of an unlawful employment act, but did not constitute an
unlawful employment act in and of itself.18 According to the Court, Ledbetter
could challenge only the two performance reviews occurring during the 180-day
statute of limitations period, and no evidence proved those decisions “unlawful.”19
The Court’s decision nulliﬁed both the back pay and punitive damages awarded
by the jury.20 The Ledbetter decision ultimately sends the message to victims
of discriminatory pay that unless challenged within six months, pay decisions
contaminated by discrimination “become grandfathered . . . beyond the province
of Title VII ever to repair.”21
This note discusses the repercussions of Ledbetter for pay discrimination cases
in the future.22 It argues that Congress should pass legislation to correct the harsh
and inequitable results of the Ledbetter decision.23 Congress must act to ensure
that Title VII continues to render broad relief to victims of discrimination.24 This
note argues the Supreme Court ruling ignores the realities of pay discrimination
in the workplace.25 Moreover, the analysis discusses current Congressional action
proposing an amendment to Title VII establishing the receipt of discriminatory
paychecks as separate employment acts.26 Finally, the analysis argues that further
Congressional action lengthening the 180-day ﬁling period is necessary to ensure
claims like Ledbetter’s are fairly brought before the court.27
16

See Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1182-83.

17

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.

18

Id. at 2169.

19

Id.

20

See id. at 2165.

21

Id. at 2178 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

22

See infra notes 221-237, 287-303 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
Ledbetter applies and its economic repercussions.
23

See infra notes 268-285 and accompanying text for suggestions of adopting a paycheck
accrual rule and lengthening the ﬁling period.
24

See infra notes 268-285 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of how discrimination is
perceived.
26

See infra notes 268-277 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ledbetter Fair Pay

27

See infra notes 278-285 and accompanying text.

Act.
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BACKGROUND
History of Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 grew out of the legacy of slavery and racial
prejudice in the United States.28 The evolution of Title VII began during World
War II when it became necessary for the country to utilize minority workers.29 At
the height of the war effort in 1942, Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order
to protect minorities in defense and government industries from discrimination
because of race, creed, color, or national origin.30 President Roosevelt also
established the Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) to monitor
the order.31 Although not included in President Roosevelt’s protections, women
also joined the inﬂux of minorities in the workplace with the government using
the iconic “Rosie the Riveter” as inspiration for women to ﬁll traditionally male
jobs.32 When the war ended, however, the civil rights movement waned.33 The
government encouraged women to relinquish their jobs to the returning troops
saying they “owed it to the boys.”34 Congress abolished the FEPC in 1946 and
racial discrimination pervaded the workplace once again.35
Public support for civil-rights gained signiﬁcant momentum by 1963, and
President Kennedy determined the time was ripe to propose major civil-rights
legislation.36 President Kennedy’s death in November 1963 threatened to stall the

28
John J. Donohue III, Historical Background, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 2, 3 (John J. Donohue III ed., 1997).
29

Id.

30

Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941).

31

Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (May 27, 1943).

1 KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII ACTIONS § 1.4 (1994). For a detailed
discussion of Title VII’s drafting and legislative history see Francis J. Vass, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1965).
32

33

SPRIGGS, supra note 32, at § 1.4.

34

Id.

35

Id.

Norbert Schlei, Foreword to 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, at vii, vii (2d ed. 1983). In May of 1963, the national press covered the
campaign against segregation in Birmingham, Alabama. Id. For the ﬁrst time “[t]he people of the
United States saw on their television screens night after night . . . the seemingly senseless use . . .
of police dogs, ﬁre hoses and other undiscriminating weapons against apparently well-behaved
demonstrators, many of them children, protesting discrimination.” Id. Other major civil-rights
protests occurred in 1963, including The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, where
Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech. See Pre 1965: Events Leading
to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007).
36
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Civil Rights Act, but President Lyndon Johnson took up the cause.37 Congress
passed the Act in 1964 making it illegal, among other things, to discriminate in
voting (Title I), public accommodations (Title II), and access to public facilities
(Title III) because of color, race, creed, or sex.38
Title VII, one of the most controversial sections of the Act, made it illegal to
pay a different wage to employees based on their color, creed, race, or sex.39 The
statute provides protection from both disparate treatment and disparate impact,
and aims to compensate wronged employees, remedy past unfair treatment and
stop future workplace discrimination.40 The statute set out to accomplish these
goals by providing injunctive relief along with monetary compensation to wronged
employees.41
President Johnson later reﬂected: “In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we
afﬁrmed through law that men equal under God are also equal when they seek a
job, when they go to get a meal in a restaurant, or when they seek lodging for the
night in any State in the Union.”42 Today, more than forty years after the passage
37

See Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/
35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). Following President Kennedy’s death,
President Johnson stated “[n]o eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory
than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.” Id.
38
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq. (2006). Congress added sex as
a protected class the day it passed the Act. Claudia Golden, Understanding the Gender Gap: An
Economic History of American Women, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 326,
332 (John J. Donohue III ed., 1997). Enemies of the bill expected that adding sex as a protected
class would stall the legislation. Id. The opposition believed persons supporting protection for
African-Americans would not be as eager to extend protection to women. SPRIGGS, supra note 32, at
§ 1.8. The plan to stall passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 backﬁred, and the House passed the
amendment without holding a hearing or considering testimonials respecting the inclusion of sex as
a protected class. John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 380, 381 (John J. Donohue III
ed., 1997). The Senate, likewise, made no objection and women quickly found themselves under
Title VII protections. Id.
39
See Schlei, supra note 36, at viii. Prior to Title VII, only the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and the Railway Labor Act provided relief from employment discrimination, but not on
the bases of race, creed, color or sex. Id. The NLRA served as a template for Title VII’s remedial
provisions. Id.
40

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (proscribing disparate treatment); § 2000e-2(a)(2) (proscribing
disparate impact); See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (explaining the
primary purpose of Title VII is to assure equality of employment and elimination of discrimination);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is . . . the purpose of Title VII to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”).
41
See Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18 (explaining that injunctive relief together with the
prospect of a back pay award prompts employers to eliminate discriminatory practices).
42
JOHN T. WOOLLEY & GERHARD PETERS, Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Civil
Rights Act, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28799/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (emphasis added). Although the Act included women under its umbrella
of protection, President Johnson tellingly referred to men as the beneﬁciaries of the new law. See
id.
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of the Act, women still earn less than men in almost every profession, at every
age and for every hour worked.43 The outlook is particularly stark in Wyoming
where the female-male earnings ratio ranks as the worst in the nation.44 Women
in Wyoming earn lower than national average wages and men earn higher than
average pay.45

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Title VII Amendments
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC to enforce Title VII’s
workplace discrimination measures.46 By providing an agency that attempts to
obtain a remedy before a party resorts to litigation, the EEOC promotes voluntary
compliance with employment discrimination law.47 As a compromise to getting
the bill passed, the EEOC did not originally have enforcement powers.48 As a
result, many civil rights activists viewed the EEOC as a “toothless tiger.”49 In 1971
Congress held hearings on proposed amendments to Title VII ﬁnding workplace
discrimination as widespread as ever, despite the best efforts of the EEOC.50
Accordingly, Congress passed the Equal Opportunity Employment Act (EOEA)
of 1972 to provide the Commission with the authority to litigate discriminatory

Daniel H. Weinberg, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, EVIDENCE
CENSUS. 2000 ABOUT EARNINGS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION FOR MEN AND WOMEN 7 (2004).

43

FROM

44
HEIDI HARTMANN, OLGA SOROKINA & ERICA WILLIAMS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH,
BRIEFING PAPER R334, THE BEST AND THE WORST STATE ECONOMIES FOR WOMEN 9 (2006), http://
www.iwpr.org/pdf/ R334_BWStateEconomies2006.pdf. In 2006 women in Wyoming made 60.7%
of what men earned. Id.
45

ANN M. ALEXANDER ET AL., WYO. COUNSEL FOR WOMEN’S ISSUES, STATE OF WYO., A STUDY OF

THE DISPARITY IN WAGES AND BENEFITS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN IN WYOMING 5 (2003), http://www.

wyomingwomens council.org/_pop-up_content/wage_disparity_intro.pdf. Although no agreement
exists as to the cause of the gender wage gap, most scholars believe wage discrimination contributes
to the disparity. See Michael Selmi, Family Leave & the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707,
715 (2000).
46
See Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/
35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
47

See Miller v. Int’l. Tel. & Telegraph, Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining
tolling applies for one year while the EEOC attempts to obtain voluntary compliance); E.E.O.C.
v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (describing Congress’s intent to encourage employers to
voluntarily comply with Title VII).
48
See Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/
35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
49
See 1965-1971: A “Toothless Tiger” Helps Shape the Law and Educate the Public, http://
www.eeoc.gov/ abouteeoc/35th/1965-71/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
50
See The 1970s: The “Toothless Tiger” Gets Its Teeth—A New Era of Enforcement, http://
www.eeoc.gov/ abouteeoc/35th/1970s/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
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claims.51 The EOEA also expanded Title VII protections to employees of most
educational institutions and federal, state and local governments.52
The next major change to Title VII did not occur until 1991.53 In July of
1989, in a series of limiting decisions dubbed the “July 1989 Massacre,” the
United States Supreme Court severely reduced Title VII’s powers.54 In response
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.55
With the 1991 amendment Congress overturned several cases including
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, a Title VII case dealing with seniority systems.56 In
Lorance, the Supreme Court ruled employees could not challenge facially neutral
seniority systems that had discriminatory effects outside the 180-day EEOC ﬁling
period.57 The 1991 amendment added language to Title VII allowing challenges
to discriminatory seniority systems both when adopted by the company and when
employees feel the discriminatory effects of the system.58

51
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(g) (2006) (giving the Commission the power to bring a suit on
behalf of employees suffering discrimination).
52

Id. at § 2000e-16 (protecting employees of the federal government and governmental
agencies from workplace discrimination).
53

Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq. (2006).

54

See Wards Cove Paving Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) (holding racial imbalance
in one segment of the workplace did not evidence disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1989) (holding a defendant could avoid liability by showing he would
have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination); Public Employees Retirement
Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 177 (1989) (holding the conditions of an employee beneﬁt plan are
exempt from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if they are not used to discriminate in
other non-fringe-beneﬁt aspects); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which gives persons of all races the same rights when entering into
private contracts, does not apply to racial harassment relating to conditions of employment after
contract formation); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 909 (1989) (holding the Title
VII statute of limitations begins at the adoption of a seniority system, not when its effects are felt);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of white ﬁreﬁghters’
reverse discrimination claims on res judicata grounds). All preceding cases superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq. (2006).
55

Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq. (2006).

56

See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112, 105 Stat. 1079 (codiﬁed as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(2)) (making an intentionally discriminatory seniority system unlawful, even if neutral
on its face, when the system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the system, or when
an individual is injured by application of the system).
57

Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981

et. seq.
58

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2006) (making an intentionally discriminatory seniority
system unlawful, even if neutral on its face, when the system is adopted, when an individual becomes
subject to the system, or when an individual is injured by application of the system).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 9

266

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

Title VII Procedural Requirements
Title VII does not pave a wide and easy road leading to an economic windfall
for those victimized by workplace discrimination.59 If a complainant does not
meet Title VII’s procedural requirements, he or she cannot bring an otherwise
legitimate claim.60 For instance, an employee must ﬁle a claim with the EEOC
before suing an employer.61 Once investigated, the EEOC may choose to ﬁle suit
on behalf of the complainant.62 If it does not, the EEOC issues a “right to sue”
letter to the complainant within 90 days.63 Upon receiving the right to sue letter,
the complainant can sue the employer in a civil court.64 Requiring a complainant
to exhaust his or her administrative remedies in this way allows the EEOC to
encourage willing resolution through negotiation.65
Additionally, a statute of limitations applies to Title VII cases.66 Urging
employees to take quick action protects the balance of interests between Title VII
protected groups and their employers.67 Imposing time limits on bringing certain
claims embodies a general notion that failing to notify a party of a pending claim
against them is fundamentally unfair.68 The relatively short limitations period of
59

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (explaining the procedural requirements of Title VII).

60

See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002) (“A discrete
retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ A party, therefore, must
ﬁle a charge within . . . 180 . . . days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.”);
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) (holding the statute of limitations barred
complainant’s claim because he did not challenge denial of tenure, but instead challenged actual
termination occurring a year later); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (holding no
claim existed alleging current discrimination where prior unchallenged termination affected current
seniority level).
61

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1) (2006).

62

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(1) (2006).

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Miller, 755 F.2d at 26 (“The purpose of the notice provision, which is to encourage settlement
of discrimination disputes through conciliation and voluntary compliance, would be defeated if a
complainant could litigate a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the EEOC.”).
66
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1) (2006) (requiring ﬁling of a discrimination charge with the
EEOC within 180 days of the “unlawful employment practice,” or if the complainant ﬁles the
charge with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practices, within
300 days of the “unlawful employment practice”). Id. Lilly Ledbetter lived and worked in Alabama,
where there is no state or local agency with the authority to grant relief, therefore the author will
assume a 180-day charging period for the purposes of this article. See Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at
1178.
67

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2170.

68

United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“Statutes of limitations . . . represent a
pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within
a speciﬁed period of time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them.’”) (quoting R.R. Tel. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944)).
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180-days reﬂects Congress’s preference for the quick resolution of employment
discrimination claims through voluntary resolution and negotiation.69
Even with this congressional preference, courts have applied broad, ﬂexible
interpretations to many Title VII procedural limitations in the past.70 Courts
have generally been lenient when interpreting Title VII procedural requirements
because lay-people, rather than trained attorneys, usually initiate proceedings.71
In Love v. Pullman, a black “porter-in-charge” alleged that those in his position
performed substantially the same work as conductors, most of whom were white,
for less pay.72 At trial the dispute centered on whether statutory requirements barred
Love’s claim since he did not ﬁle a second formal charge with the EEOC once
the state commission formally discharged his claim.73 The United States Supreme
Court refused to require Love to ﬁle a second formal complaint, reasoning that
the procedure followed fully complied with the intent and purposes of Title VII.74
Concerned with the ability of employees to challenge discriminatory acts, the
Supreme Court has also held that statutes of limitation “should not commence to
run so soon that it becomes difﬁcult for a layman to invoke the protection of the
civil rights statutes.”75
Despite the Court’s ﬂexible interpretation of Title VII’s procedural
requirements, failure to ﬁle a claim within 180-days of the unlawful employment

69
See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) (“By choosing what are obviously
quite short deadlines, Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges
of employment discrimination.”).
70
Jeffery M. Fisher, Note, In the Wake of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.: Interpreting
Title VII’s Statute of Limitations for Facially Neutral Seniority Systems, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 711, 71213 (1990) (discussing Title VII policies of exposing discrimination, allowing laymen to vindicate
their rights and eliminating inequity).
71

See Egelson v. State Univ. Coll., 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976)
Title VII is rife with procedural requirements which are sufﬁciently labyrinthine
to bafﬂe the most experienced lawyer, yet its enforcement mechanisms are usually
triggered by laymen. Were we to interpret the statute’s procedural prerequisites
stringently, the ultimate result would be to shield illegal discrimination from the
reach of the Act.

See also Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1972) (describing actions which create additional
procedural technicalities and nothing else as “particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in
which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process”).
72
Love, 404 U.S. at 523. Love ﬁrst ﬁled a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
but the claim was terminated without a satisfactory conclusion. Id. Love then ﬁled a “letter of
inquiry” with the EEOC, and the EEOC orally informed the Colorado Commission that it had
received the complaint. Id. at 524. The Colorado Commission waived the option to take further
action and the EEOC ﬁled suit on Love’s behalf. Id.
73

Id. at 524.

74

Id. at 526-27.

75

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 262 n.16.
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practice has proven fatal to many employment discrimination claims.76 Most
Title VII discrimination claims hinge on two questions: 1) What is the unlawful
employment practice complained of? and 2) Did the employee ﬁle a claim with
the EEOC within 180-days of that act?77

Cases Deﬁning an “Unlawful Employment Practice”
After the passage of Title VII the Court struggled to deﬁne what constituted
an “unlawful employment practice” and when those practices occurred.78 Starting
with United Airlines v. Evans the Court made it clear that an unlawful employment
practice occurred on the date of communication, and other later effects of that
decision or act could not be challenged outside the 180-day ﬁling period.79 Several
subsequent cases followed the Evans Court in refusing to recognize the effects of
a discriminatory act as actionable.80
Starting with United Airlines v. Evans, the Supreme Court began to identify
the speciﬁc employment acts at issue to determine when the Title VII ﬁling period
started to run.81 In 1968, United Airlines (United) forced Carolyn Evans to resign
because it refused to employ married ﬂight attendants.82 Despite her termination,
Evans failed to ﬁle an EEOC charge within the requisite ﬁling period.83 United
later rehired Evans, but calculated her seniority level using her new hire date,
rather than her original hire date.84 Evans sued United alleging that the company’s
refusal to give her credit for prior service gave current effect to past illegal acts
and carried on the effects of unlawful discrimination.85 While the Supreme Court
agreed that the airline’s actions continued to impact her pay, it determined no
present violation existed.86 United was free to treat the past act as lawful once
the time for Evans to dispute the act had expired.87 She could not sue based on

76

See Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110; Lorance, 490
U.S. at 912, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.
77

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. 2179.

78

See infra notes 79-131 and accompanying text.

79

See Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.

80

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110; Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912, superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.
81

Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.

82

Id. at 554.

83

Id. at 554-55. At the time of Evans’s suit the statute allowed 90 days from the unlawful
employment act to ﬁle a claim. Id. at 558.
84

Id. at 555.

85

Id. at 557.

86

Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.

87

Id.
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the effects of a previous unlawful act.88 Evans could object to her termination
immediately following its occurrence, but she could not attack effects of the
termination later.89
The Supreme Court considered the ﬁring of an employee for discriminatory
reasons again in Delaware State College v. Ricks, and reached a similar conclusion.90
In Ricks, Delaware State College denied tenure to a black Liberian professor.91
The college did not terminate Ricks immediately, but gave him a ﬁnal one-year
contract.92 The Court held that the EEOC charging period ran from “the time the
tenure decision was made and communicated,” not from the time of his actual
termination.93
The Court again held the effects of a discriminatory act not independently
actionable in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.94 In Lorance, the dispute arose out
of AT&T’s changes to seniority systems under a collective bargaining agreement.95
Before the collective bargaining agreement, AT&T based its seniority simply on
the number of years an employee worked for the company in any position.96 The
new agreement based seniority on the time an employee spent in the “tester”
position alone, rather than time the employee spent with the company overall.97
Female testers did not feel the full effect of this change until several years later
when AT&T made lay-off decisions.98 At that point, AT&T laid-off many female
testers, who had long service records with the company, but did not work as testers
during their entire tenure.99 On the other hand, AT&T retained many men who
had more seniority in the tester position, but less seniority than the female testers

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254.

91

Id. at 252.

92

Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252-53. Ricks neglected to ﬁle an EEOC charge alleging a discriminatory
tenure decision until just before the one-year contract expired. Id. at 252. Ricks argued that the
EEOC ﬁling period ran from the date of his actual termination, not from the decision to deny
tenure. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that the decision to deny tenure constituted the
actual unlawful employment act even though actual termination, one of the effects of the decision,
did not occur until later. Id. at 253.
93

Id. at 258.

94

Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981

et. seq.
95

Id. at 901-02.

96

Id.

97

Id. Male employees traditionally ﬁlled the highly skilled position of “tester.” Id. at 902-03.

98

Id. at 902.

99

Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902-03, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 et. seq.
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overall.100 When the female employees ﬁled charges with the EEOC, the Supreme
Court held that time barred the suits because the discrete act of adopting the
new seniority system occurred more than 180-days before the women ﬁled their
EEOC charges.101 Their ﬁring was merely an effect of the discrete action and
therefore not actionable on its own.102
In a recent decision, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme
Court differentiated between discrete acts of discrimination and acts that make
up a pattern or practice of discrimination in the workplace.103 Morgan, a black
employee, sued Amtrak alleging that the company had wrongfully suspended
him, denied training, falsely accused him of threatening a manager and subjected
him to a hostile work environment.104 In its decision, the Morgan Court separated
discriminatory acts into two categories.105 First, an act could consist of a series of
events, none of which represent a claim on their own, but together amount to an
“unlawful employment practice.”106 For these types of actions a complainant could
reach outside of the 180-day ﬁling period to prove discriminatory intent as long
as at least one of the acts occurred within the 180-day period.107 Second, an act
could be a distinct, one-time occurrence such as a hiring, ﬁring, or promotion.108
A complainant could challenge these acts independently, and must ﬁle a claim
within 180-days of the occurrence of this type of act.109 In Morgan’s case, the
Court held the complainant could only challenge the discrete discriminatory
acts occurring within the ﬁling period.110 Time barred an individual claim for all
other discrete, easily identiﬁable acts, but they could serve as evidence to support
Morgan’s hostile work environment claim.111
100

Id.

101

Id. at 906.

102

Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 supersedes the Lorance decision by making an intentionally
discriminatory seniority system unlawful, even if neutral on its face, when the system is adopted,
when an individual becomes subject to the system, or when an individual is injured by application
of the system. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112, 105 Stat. 1079 (codiﬁed as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(2)).
103

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105.

104

Id. at 115.

105

Id. at 111-15.

106

Id. at 115-16.

107

Id. A hostile work environment is an example of such an employment practice. See id. at

108

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111-13.

105.
109

Id. at 111-13. The Court stressed the need to identify the exact employment practice at
issue to determine which category to apply. Id. at 110-11.
110

Id. at 114.

111

Id. at 115. As for Morgan’s claim, the Court held evidence from outside the ﬁling period
can help determine liability, as long as at least one act contributing to the claim occurred with in
the speciﬁed period. Id. at 117. The Court ultimately remanded the case for a determination of
Amtrak’s liability. Id. at 122.
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These four cases clearly illustrate that an employee must challenge a
discrete discriminatory act within the prescribed ﬁling period.112 None of these
cases, however, dealt with Lilly Ledbetter’s problem, that of discriminatory
paychecks.113

The “Paycheck Accrual Rule”
Before Ledbetter v. Goodyear, the only Supreme Court decision dealing
with discriminatory paychecks was Bazemore v. Friday.114 In that case, AfricanAmerican employees of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service (the
Extension Service), a federal agency, brought suit against the United States.115
The Extension Service historically separated its employees into a “white branch”
and a “negro branch,” with the “negro branch” receiving less pay.116 In 1965,
the Extension Service merged the two branches, but did not adjust the wages to
compensate for the previous differences.117 Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not extend its protections to federal government employees, the Extension Service
did not violate federal law by allowing the disparities to continue.118 When the
1972 amendment to Title VII made discrimination by the federal government
actionable, African-American employees of the Extension Service ﬁled suit.119
The Supreme Court found the merging of the two branches in 1965 did not
eliminate the difference in salaries.120 The Court reasoned while the discriminatory
pay scale was not unlawful at the time of the merging in 1965, it perpetuated
discrimination by the Extension Service from 1972 onward.121 While the African
American employees could not recover back pay for the time that Title VII did not
prohibit such discriminatory pay scales, they could recover for post-1972 disparate
pay.122 The practice of keeping two pay scales would have been a violation of Title
VII had the statute applied to the Extension Service in 1964; therefore, once the
Extension Service came under Title VII protections, the dual pay scale system

112

See supra, notes 78-111 and accompanying text.

113

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2172 (explaining Ledbetter’s argument that her case is not
governed by the Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan line of cases, but rather by Bazemore v. Friday,
478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam) a case dealing speciﬁcally with disparate pay).
114

See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 394 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence
which all other members of the Court joined. Id. at 389.
115

Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., concurring).

116

Id at 390 (Brennan, J., concurring).

117

Id. at 390-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).

118

See Spriggs, supra note 32, at § 1.8.

119

Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 390 (Brennan, J., concurring).

120

Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., concurring).

121

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).

122

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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became unlawful.123 To the degree the Extension Service issued discriminatory
paychecks under that system, it owed employees compensatory back pay.124
The Extension Service hired new employees at equal salaries after the 1965
merger; however, some of these employees alleged discriminatory pay stemming
from individual pay decisions, not from the two-branch system.125 The Court
concluded that the Extension Service had an obligation to remedy any racially
motivated pay disparities present after 1972, whether stemming from a facially
discriminatory pay scale or from individual discriminatory decisions.126 The
Court maintained that each time the Extension Service paid a black man less
than a similarly situated white man it violated Title VII, regardless of whether the
Extension Service acted legally when discriminating in the ﬁrst instance.127
Since the 1985 Bazemore opinion, the majority of circuits followed Justice
Brennan’s “paycheck accrual rule.”128 This rule states that each paycheck constitutes
a separate employment practice and with each issuance of a paycheck a separate
ﬁling period begins to run, during which the employee has 180-days to challenge
the discriminatory paycheck.129 The EEOC, too, interpreted the Act as allowing
employees to challenge disparate pay each time an employer issues a paycheck.130
It is against the background of these ﬁve cases that Lilly Ledbetter brought her
discriminatory pay claim against Goodyear.

123

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).

124

Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., concurring).

125

Id. at 397 n.8 (noting these “two distinct types of salary claims”) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
126

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).

127

Id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Each week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black
than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that
this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII.”).
128

See, e.g., Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 258 (Third Circuit holding that “in a Title VII case claiming
discriminatory pay, the receipt of each paycheck is a continuing violation”); Ashley, 66 F.3d at 168,
abrogated on other grounds by Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003) (Eighth Circuit
holding that “Ashley’s Title VII pay claim is timely because she received allegedly discriminatory
paychecks within 300 days prior to the ﬁling of her administrative charge”); Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d
at 346 (Fourth Circuit holding that “paychecks are to be considered continuing violations of the law
when they evidence discriminatory wages”); Calloway, 986 F.2d at 446 (Eleventh Circuit holding
that “contrary to Partners’ assertions, Calloway’s wage claim is not a single violation with a continuing
effect . . . When the claim is one for discriminatory wages the violation exists every single day the
employee works”); Gibbs, 785 F.2d at 1400 (Ninth Circuit holding that “the policy of paying lower
wages . . . on each payday constitutes a continuing violation”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Hall, 669 F.2d at 398 (Sixth Circuit holding the “the discrimination was continuing in nature. Hall
suffered a denial of equal pay with each check she received.”).
129

See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., concurring).

130

2 EEOC Compliance Manual §2-IV-C(1)(a), p. 605:0024, n.183 (2006) (“[R]epeated
occurrences of the same discriminatory employment action, such as a discriminatory paycheck, can
be challenged as long as one discriminatory act occurred within the charge ﬁling period.”).
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PRINCIPAL CASE
At the end of her nineteen year career, Lilly Ledbetter learned Goodyear
consistently paid her less than her male counterparts.131 After conﬁrming this
information, Ledbetter ﬁled an EEOC questionnaire alleging sex discrimination.132
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires that a complainant ﬁle such a charge
within 180-days of the unlawful employment practice.133 At trial, Ledbetter
alleged that each discriminatory paycheck Goodyear issued constituted an
unlawful employment act and that she received several paychecks in the 180-days
before ﬁling her EEOC charge.134 The trial court agreed, and awarded Ledbetter a
back pay and punitive damages award.135 Goodyear appealed, arguing paychecks
constituted merely a discriminatory effect and could not be challenged on their
own.136 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
Goodyear and reversed the trial court’s decision.137 Ledbetter appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.138

The Majority Opinion
The majority agreed with the Eleventh Circuit ruling that Ledbetter’s paychecks
simply represented effects of past discriminatory decisions.139 According to the
Supreme Court, the actual pay-setting decisions constituted the discriminatory
act.140 Two pay-setting decisions occurred within 180-days of Ledbetter’s EEOC
claim; however, no evidence supported discriminatory intent behind those
two acts.141 As a result Ledbetter could not prevail on her discriminatory pay
claim.142

The Effects of Discrete Acts Are Not Actionable
The Ledbetter Court relied on the Evans, Ricks, Lorance and Morgan series of
Title VII decisions to support the holding that the time for ﬁling a charge with

131

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1174.

132

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

133

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1) (2006).

134

Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1181.

135

Id. at 1175-76.

136

Id. at 1181.

137

Id. at 1181-84.

138

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.

139

Id.

140

Id. at 2167.

141

See id. at 2166.

142

See id. at 2172.
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the EEOC begins when the “unlawful employment practice” occurs.143 Ledbetter
urged the Court to view each issuance of a paycheck paying her less than similarly
situated males as the exact employment practice at issue.144 The Court rejected this
argument stating a paycheck represents merely an effect of a speciﬁc employment
practice and is not actionable on its own.145
The Court viewed Ledbetter’s depressed paychecks as merely effects of past
unlawful pay setting decisions.146 Because Ledbetter did not challenge the actual
pay decisions within 180-days, the discriminatory decision to pay her less than her
male counterparts was “an unfortunate event in history which ha[d] no present
legal consequences.”147
Applying Delaware State College v. Ricks, the Court reasoned Ledbetter could
have disputed the decisions to pay her less than her male counterparts, but not the
paychecks implementing those decisions.148 Because Ledbetter failed to identify
any speciﬁc discriminatory act persisted until, or took place at the time of, her
resignation, time barred her Title VII claim.149
The Ledbetter Court relied on the same analysis that instructed its decision in
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.150 The Lorance Court saw the termination of
female employees as an effect of adopting a facially neutral seniority system.151 As in
Evans and Ricks, the Lorance Court held that the time to challenge a discriminatory
act started at the moment of the alleged discrimination, not when employees felt
the effects of that discrimination.152 Like the female AT&T employees, suffering
termination more than 180-days after adoption of a discriminatory seniority

143

See Evans, 431 U.S. at 558; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110; Lorance, 490
U.S. at 912, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.
144

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2167.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977)). The Court went on to state “[i]t would be difﬁcult to speak to the point more directly”
than the Evans decision. Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.
148

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2168. Ricks challenged his actual termination, which occurred
more than 180-days after the College’s denial of tenure. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254. The Court denied
his claim because he failed to name an employment act that “continued until, or occurred at the
time of, the actual termination of his employment.” Id. at 257.
149

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.

150

Id.; Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 et. seq. The female AT&T employees did not challenge the new seniority system within the
speciﬁed ﬁling period, nor did they allege the company adopted a facially discriminatory system or
applied the system in a discriminatory way. Id. at 907-08.
151

Lorance. 409 U.S. at 907-08.

152

Id. at 912.
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system, Ledbetter could not challenge the paychecks issued more than 180-days
after the decisions to pay her less.153
Finally, the Court referenced National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
to deﬁne the phrase “employment practice” as one that generally refers to “a
discrete act or single ‘occurrence’” that takes place at a particular point in time.154
Termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire qualify as
such discrete acts.155 The Court used Morgan to support its decision that the acts
Ledbetter complained of must occur within the 180-day charge ﬁling period.156
The Evans, Ricks, Lorance and Morgan line of cases led the Court to decide
that a new infraction, with a fresh ﬁling period, does not occur when nondiscriminatory actions carry out past discriminatory acts.157 For example, the
issuance of a depressed paycheck is not a new violation simply because it gives
effect to a past discriminatory decision.158 Since Ledbetter argued that Goodyear’s
issuance of depressed paychecks gave present effect to discriminatory acts outside
the 180-day ﬁling period, but made no claim that intentionally discriminatory
conduct occurred within the ﬁling period, she could not maintain her claim.159

The “Paycheck Accrual Rule” Does Not Apply
The Ledbetter Court declined to follow Bazemore v. Friday while not speciﬁcally overruling it.160 The Court explained that Ledbetter interpreted Justice
Brennan’s decision in Bazemore too broadly.161 According to the Court, the
“paycheck accrual rule” applied only to situations involving facially discriminatory
wage practices.162 Because Ledbetter did not prove, or even assert, a facially
discriminatory pay system, the Court held Bazemore did not apply to her case.163
Since Goodyear’s pay system did not assign some employees to a lower scale based
on their gender, Goodyear did not engage in intentional discrimination each time
it delivered a depressed paycheck.164 Ledbetter’s paychecks were merely an effect of
153

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2168.

154

Id. at 2169 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11

(2002)).
155

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.

156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.

159

Id. (“Ledbetter should have ﬁled an EEOC charge within 180-days after each allegedly
discriminatory pay decision was made and communicated to her.”).
160

Id. at 2167, 2173-74.

161

Id. at 2173.

162

Id.

163

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2174.

164

Id. at 2173.
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the discriminatory pay raise decisions by her supervisors.165 The Court determined
the paychecks do not stand alone; Ledbetter could dispute only the pay decisions
themselves.166 Because Goodyear made the individual decisions to pay Ledbetter
a lower wage based on her gender before the 180-day charging period, the statute
of limitations barred review of these decisions under Title VII.167

The Dissent
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Souter, Breyer and Stevens, argued that pay disparities have a closer kinship to
situations where the cumulative effect of discriminatory behavior comprises
the “unlawful employment practice,” like hostile work environment claims.168
In contrast to the hiring or ﬁring of an employee, pay discrimination does not
generally appear as a fully communicated, discrete act.169 Pay disparities often
occur in small increments which are either not actionable on their own, or not
worth the time, hassle, or prospect of retaliation.170 Only when these small
disparities compound over time, does an employee realize her situation and ﬁnd
it worthwhile to complain.171
The Ledbetter dissent explained that pay disparities differ from the termination
and failure to promote actions of Evans, Ricks and Morgan.172 Employees can easily
identify terminations, promotions and demotions as potentially discriminatory
practices.173 An employer communicates these types of “discrete acts” directly
to the employee and such decisions become common knowledge among other
employees.174 An employee must challenge these decisions within 180-days and
the effects of these decisions are not actionable on their own.175

165

Id. at 2169.

166

Id. at 2174.

167

Id. Two pay setting decisions did occur during the 180-day charging period. Id. at 2166.
Ledbetter did not present evidence showing these decisions as discriminatory, but rather argued that
the decisions were actionable because they gave effect to previous unlawful decisions. Id. at 2167.
The Court summarily rejected this argument as challenging an effect of an employment practice,
not an actual act. Id.
168

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2178-79 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).

169

Id. at 2179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

170

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

171

Id. at 2179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Goodyear’s pay system based pay raises on a percentage
of the employee’s current salary; therefore each of Ledbetter’s pay decisions reafﬁrmed her unlawfully
low base salary. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172

Id. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

173

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2182. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

174

Id. at 2181. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

175

Id. at 2169.
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The dissent argued challenges to discriminatory pay, however, are different
and deserve individual treatment.176 A discriminatory pay decision often appears
as good news, perhaps as a raise.177 Employers frequently refuse to disseminate
salary information and employees often keep their earnings conﬁdential.178 Once
an employee suspects discrimination the discrepancy may seem too small to
dispute or the employer’s intent too ambiguous to prove.179 Like a hostile work
environment, where many events make up one discriminatory employment
practice, each paycheck Goodyear issued aggravated Lilly Ledbetter’s injury.180

ANALYSIS
This analysis section begins by exploring the Court’s decision in light of the
realities of the workplace.181 Next, it discusses the Court’s misapplication of United
Airlines v. Evans and subsequent cases centering on discrete employment acts.182
Third, the analysis discusses the effect of the Ledbetter decision on bringing claims
in the future.183 Finally, the analysis argues that Congress must declare the receipt
of each paycheck an actionable employment practice and lengthen the 180-day
ﬁling period.184

The Court’s Decision Ignores the Realities of Pay Discrimination
The Court’s ruling plainly ignores the realities of the workplace.185 Employees
do not identify pay disparities immediately.186 Employers frequently encourage

176

Id. at 2179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

177

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

178

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2181-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

179

Id. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

180

Id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

181

See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of obstacles in perceiving
and reporting discrimination in the workplace.
182

See infra notes 205-220 and accompanying text.

183

See infra notes 221-237 and accompanying text for a discussion of a discovery rule and
equitable tolling.
184

See infra notes 268-285 and accompanying text. At the outset, it is important to observe
that this note references female employees because Ledbetter’s case dealt with gender discrimination.
However, the Supreme Court’s “cramped” reading of Title VII in Ledbetter affects the ability of
other protected classes to maintain similar actions. Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct at 2188 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). The Court’s decision arguably impacts women less than those experiencing
discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin. Id. at 2186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
No speciﬁc legislation, such as the Equal Pay Act, protects these other classes from disparate pay. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
185

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2178-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

186

Id. at 2179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 1, Art. 9

278

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

workers not to discuss salaries with other employees.187 Even if an employer
does not discourage discussing pay, social etiquette often keeps workers from
sharing salaries with one another.188 Because of this, those suffering from wage
discrimination often only learn of the disparity when a colleague informs them or
by some other accident.189 When a company ﬁres, demotes or refuses to promote
an employee, she can seek explanation from the employer.190 Pay discrimination,
however, rarely comes with an explanation, comparative information or other
recognizable sign of prejudice.191
The Ledbetter Court also disregarded how victims perceive and react to
real-life discrimination.192 Those who suffer disparate treatment often do not
immediately identify discrimination as the cause.193 Even if an employee recognizes
discrimination for what it is, this does not mean she will immediately ﬁle an
EEOC charge.194 Employees often fear retaliation, whether legal or illegal, from
their employers.195 Complaining employees may worry about a reputation as a
troublemaker or “squeaky wheel.”196 Unwillingness to disrupt the workplace or
to compromise her own position may lead an employee to tolerate a pay disparity
even after she has learned of her employer’s discrimination.197
187
See Leonard Bierman, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms
and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004) (explaining one-third of United
States private employers have adopted speciﬁc pay secrecy policies even though such policies directly
conﬂict with the law).
188
See Abby Ellin, Want To Stop the Conversation? Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2003, § 3, at 9.
189
See, e.g., Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2002)
(describing a situation where complainant did not know what other employees earned until a
printout of employee salaries appeared on her desk, showing that her starting wage was lower than
that of her co-workers).
190

Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at
13, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL
2570985. [hereinafter Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams.].
191

Id.

See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25 (2005) (discussing psychological
and social forces working to stiﬂe claims of discrimination).
192

193
Id. at 27 (describing subjects of a research experiment who consistently blamed poor test
results on themselves even when told their evaluator was biased against their social group).
194
Id. at 37 (discussing the social costs, such as retaliation, of reporting perceived
discrimination).
195
Id. at 20. Title VII makes it illegal to ﬁre an employee because he or she ﬁles an EEOC claim.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). But see Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,
271 (holding Title VII protections against retaliation only apply if the employee holds a reasonable
belief of discrimination).
196
See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving and
Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 819 (2006) (ﬁnding that regardless of their
gender, subjects of a research experiment regarded a fellow test-taker as more of a “complainer” if he
or she blamed failure on discrimination by the grader rather than their own skills).
197

Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams. supra note 190, at 13.
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Although Ledbetter involved an employee with a long work history, the Court’s
opinion places a special burden on new employees.198 Inexperienced employees
lack knowledge of the particular workplace and established relationships with coworkers which foster the ability to recognize discrimination.199 Terminated new
employees face special risks because they lack an established employment record
to demonstrate their ﬁrings resulted from discrimination rather than poor job
performance.200
The Court’s decision is not in line with workplace realities.201 It takes time
and well established relationships for employees to learn of pay disparities.202 The
Court’s decision that any perceived discrimination must be challenged within
180-days of the pay-setting decision does not allow enough time for discovery of
the disparities.203 Even if an employee does discover the disparity, he or she may
hesitate to report it because of real social and professional costs.204

Ledbetter’s Case is Not Controlled by United Airlines v. Evans
The Court mistakenly emphasized the Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan line
of cases.205 These cases stand for the principle that discrete discriminatory acts
must be challenged within 180-days of their occurrence.206 Ledbetter, however,
challenged her disparate pay.207 She did not challenge the effect of a clearly
communicated decision such as termination or tenure denial.208 Her case turns on
whether a discriminatory paycheck constitutes a present violation of Title VII.209
Nothing in Evans, Ricks, Lorance, or Morgan speaks to the issue of paychecks at
all.210

198

Id. at 15.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

See supra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.

202

See supra note 199 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.

204

See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.

205

Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 16, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127
S. Ct. 2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 2610990.
206

See supra notes 78-130 and accompanying text.

207

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2167.

208

Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 205, at 16.

209

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. 2167.

210

Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 205, at 3. While Evans alleged that she
received less pay, she did not allege that United decided to pay her less because of her sex, but instead
that United’s unlawful act affected her seniority level. Id. Ledbetter, on the other hand brought an
ordinary disparate pay claim, alleging Goodyear decided to pay her less based on gender. Id.
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Bazemore v. Friday is the only United States Supreme Court case addressing
whether pay discrimination occurs with the pay decision alone, or each time the
employer issues a paycheck.211 The Ledbetter Court reasoned that Bazemore only
applies to facially discriminatory pay systems.212 However, the Bazemore decision,
itself, made no such distinction.213
Only a slight difference exists between a facially discriminatory pay system
and individual acts of discrimination.214 A facially discriminatory system victimizes
with each application because it treats similarly situated employees differently.215
An individual discriminatory pay decision likewise treats similarly situated workers
differently by paying one employee less than others doing the same work.216
Further undermining its case, the Ledbetter Court supported its decision with
Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, which Congress overruled in 1991.217 Lorance dealt
with a “facially non-discriminatory and neutrally applied” seniority system.218
The Ledbetter Court also interpreted Goodyear’s pay system as facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied.219 Nevertheless, as Congress made clear by
overturning Lorance, a facially non-discriminatory and neutrally applied system
does not reside outside the sphere of Title VII protections.220

When Does the Clock Start Ticking?
The Ledbetter Court left several unanswered questions regarding how the
Title VII limitations period now applies.221 Most troubling, the Court made no
211

Id.

212

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2174.

213

Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397 n.8 (noting “two distinct types of salary claims,” those stemming
from the Extension Service’s facially discriminatory pay system existing before 1965 (a facially
discriminatory practice) and individual decisions discriminating against black employees hired after
1965 at equal starting pay (a facially neutral practice)).
214

See Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 205, at 9.

215

See id.

216

See id.

217

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s extensive reliance
on Lorance . . . is perplexing for that decision is no longer effective.”). Id. Congress superseded
the Lorance decision with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, making discriminatory seniority systems
actionable when implemented or when employees feel the impacts of the system. Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.
218

Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981

et. seq.
219

See Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. 2174.

220

See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq.

221

Deborah Brake & Joanna Grossman, Reviving Title VII’s Protection Against Pay Discrimination
In the Wake of the Supreme Court’s Harsh Decision: A Call for Congressional Action, FINDLAW, July
10, 2007, http://writ.news.ﬁndlaw.com/commentary/20070710_brake.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2007). [hereinafter Brake & Grossman].
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clear statement deﬁning what kind of information an employee must know in
order to start the 180-day limitation “clock.”222 It stated only that the employee
must ﬁle a claim 180 days from when the employer made and communicated the
discriminatory pay decision.223 Read strictly, the employee must ﬁle an EEOC
claim within 180 days of every pay decision made, even if she does not discover
or suspect discrimination during that 180-day period.224 “If so, then Title VII pay
claims have just been relegated to the dustbin of civil rights history.”225

Discovery Rule
Perhaps the majority meant the clock starts ticking when an employee
discovers the employer’s discriminatory intent.226 Instead of providing guidance as
to what the employee must know and when, the Court simply stated it has never
speciﬁed whether a discovery rule applies to Title VII.227 A discovery rule stops
the limitations period from starting until the employee discovers (or reasonably
should have discovered) the facts establishing a claim.228 If a court decides to
apply a discovery rule, there exists no clear rule on how much an employee must
know to trigger the ﬁling period.229 The clock may start to tick when an employee
learns she received less pay than her male counterparts, or simply that she received
a lower raise than her colleagues.230 But even more speciﬁc pay information will
often not alert an employee to a potential claim without other circumstances
pointing to underlying discrimination.231 Instead of fashioning a bright-line rule,
the Court has left it to the lower federal courts to decide how to apply a discovery
rule, if at all.232

Equitable Tolling
If the lower courts decide against applying a discovery rule, equitable tolling
may operate to delay the start of the ﬁling period until the complainant discovers

222

Id.

223

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2169.

224

Brake & Grossman, supra note 221.

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2177 n.10 (stating that the Court declined to address whether a
discovery rule applied to Title VII in Morgan, and declining to do so in this case).
228
See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. 1984) (holding that the statute of
limitations to bring a wrongful birth suit did not begin to run until the parents of a sick child knew
of, or through diligence and care should have known of, their child’s illness).
229

Brake & Grossman, supra note 221.

230

Id.

231

Id.

232

Id.
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she has been a victim of disparate pay.233 Equitable tolling functions to stop the
statute of limitations from running when the accrual date for a claim has already
passed.234 While the Supreme Court has held that equitable tolling applies to
Title VII cases, it has limited application to extraordinary circumstances, such as
active concealment by an employer.235 Tolling may also apply to practices where
an employee can show a reasonably prudent person could not possibly have
discovered the discriminatory intent behind the act until after the ﬁling period
expired.236 While equitable tolling should certainly apply in such drastic situations,
active concealment and practical impossibility are not the classic reasons why
victims do not recognize pay discrimination.237

Protection from Stale Claims
The Court argued that limiting challenges to discrete pay decisions, rather
than allowing each paycheck to stand alone as a discrete act “protect[s] employers
from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that
are long past.”238 But, as the dissent pointed out, Goodyear inﬂicted increasing
damage with each paycheck issued; the employment decision was not long past.239
An employee cannot begin the process of recovery when the pay decision occurs
because there is nothing to recover until the employee receives the paycheck.240

233

Id.

234

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994). The
doctrines of equitable tolling and the discovery rule are similar because they both require the
plaintiff to exercise due diligence in discovering an injury. Id. at 1390. The difference lies in the type
of knowledge the plaintiff must acquire. Id. The discovery rule focuses on a plaintiff ’s knowledge of
an actual injury. Id. Equitable tolling, however, focuses on a plaintiff ’s knowledge of the facts that
support a cause of action. Id. Additionally, equitable tolling serves to stop the statute of limitations
from running once a cause of action has accrued, where the discovery rule functions to start the
statute of limitations when the plaintiff learns of the cause of action. See id. at 1385, 1390.
235
Olson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that equitable tolling
only applies when an employer has “wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal
the existence of a cause of action” (quoting English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th
Cir. 1987)); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding that equitable tolling
applies to Title VII cases).
236
Miller, 755 F.2d at 24 (suggesting “[a]n extraordinary circumstance permitting tolling of
the time bar on equitable grounds might exist if the employee could show that it would have been
impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn that his discharge was discriminatory”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
237

See Brake & Grossman, supra note 221. See also, supra notes 185-220 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the classic reasons employees do not recognize discrimination.
238

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting Ricks v. Del. State. Coll., 449 U.S. at 250, 256-57
(1979)).
239
Id. at 2185-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As she alleged, and as the jury found, Goodyear
continued to treat Ledbetter differently because of sex each pay period, with mounting harm.”).
240

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams, supra note 190, at 9.
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Goodyear supervisors had access to pay information and refused to remedy
Ledbetter’s disparate pay situation even though she obviously earned less money
than every other man in her position.241 Just as the Extension Service in Bazemore
had a duty to repair discriminatory pay disparities, Goodyear had an obligation to
ensure that Ledbetter’s pay decisions and paychecks did not carry forward salary
disparities based on gender.242
Allowing employees to challenge discrimination that began before the charging
period and continue into it will not “leave employers defenseless” against unfair
or harmful delay.243 The defense of laches will protect the employer when delay
prejudices a party.244 This provision will effectively eliminate stale claims.245 The
courts can also employ waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling, allowing the ability
to correct discrimination and give an employer adequate notice of a claim.246
Additionally, although the majority of lower circuit courts applied the paycheck
accrual rule for twenty years, Goodyear presented no evidence that the rule had
inundated employers with an unreasonable number of stale pay claims.247

Congressional Intent in Title VII’s Back Pay Provision and Civil Rights Act
Amendments
The Court’s holding in Ledbetter does not promote Title VII’s goals of
preventing discrimination and compensating victims.248 The Court abandoned
the broad and equitable approach of its previous Title VII decisions, establishing
evenhanded administration of the law as its ﬁrst priority.249
The Ledbetter Court refused to adopt a “special rule” for pay discrimination
cases.250 Title VII’s back pay provision, however, indicates that Congress intended
241

See Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 205, at 20.

242

See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397.

243

See Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of Prof. Deborah Brake). It is the employee, not
the employer, who suffers when a suit is delayed. Id. The plaintiff carries the burden of proof and
evidence of intentional discrimination is harder to discover as time passes. Id.
244
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121 (explaining the defense of laches can block suit from a complainant
“if [an employee] unreasonably delays in ﬁling and as a result harms the defendant”).
245

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

246

Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398 (holding application of waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling
allows the Court “to honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the
particular purpose of the ﬁling requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer”).
247

Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 205, at 16.

248

See Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 418 (describing the purpose of Title VII to make employees
whole for unlawful discrimination).
249
Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct at 2171-72. (“Ultimately, ‘experience teaches that strict adherence
to the procedural requirements speciﬁed by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded
administration of the law.’” (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 477 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
250

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2176.
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to treat disparate pay cases differently than other types of discrimination claims.251
Thus, the Court’s refusal to allow challenges of pay discrimination that began
before, and continued into, the 180-day charging period renders the statute’s back
pay provision virtually meaningless.252
Title VII states “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two
years prior to the ﬁling of a charge with the Commission.”253 In National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court established back pay awards arising
out of termination and failure to promote actions only reach back to the date of
the “discrete act.”254 This discrete act must take place within the 180-day EEOC
charging period.255 Therefore, a court could never award two-years of back pay in
these situations.256
Perhaps hostile work environment claims can take advantage of the two-year
back pay provision, even if claims concerning discrete acts cannot.257 For hostile
environment claims, a complainant can reach back to occurrences before the 180day ﬁling period to establish discriminatory intent as long as at least one of those
occurrences occurred within the 180-days.258 Even if an employee reaches back
further than 180-days to prove discriminatory intent, however, the Supreme Court
decided the back pay remedy does not apply to hostile environment claims.259
The last common type of Title VII claim is disparate pay.260 Since the back pay
provision does not apply to other types of claims, Congress must have foreseen
challenges to pay discrimination cases that began before, and continued into, the
180-day ﬁling period.261 Congress intended the two-year back pay provision to

251

Id. at 2184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

252

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams., supra note 190, at 25.

253

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).

254

See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. For example, if an employee was unlawfully terminated and
ﬁled an EEOC claim exactly 180 days later, they could only be awarded back pay for 180 days worth
of work. See id. A complainant could never reach the Title VII limit of two-year’s back pay with this
type of claim. See id.
255

42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1).

256

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams., supra note190, at 25.

257

Id.

258

See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.

259

See Penn. St. Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004) (holding that back pay is available
for hostile environment claims only when there has been a “constructive discharge,” which is treated
as a termination).
260

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams., supra note 190, at 25.

261

See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 119 (“If Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring
in the period which the party must ﬁle the charge, it seems unlikely that Congress would have
allowed recovery for two years of back pay.”).
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apply directly to these cases, allowing an employee to recover what they should
have been paid absent discrimination.262
Congressional intent becomes even clearer when examining the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.263 At the time of the amendment, most
circuits decided pay discrimination cases in accordance with “paycheck accrual
rule” articulated in Bazemore v. Friday.264 If Congress disagreed with the Court’s
ruling in Bazemore, or how the circuits and the EEOC applied the “paycheck
accrual rule,” it certainly had the power and opportunity to clarify Title VII as it
relates to pay discrimination when amending the statute.265 Instead, the Senate
Report stated:
Where, as was alleged in Lorance, an employer adopts a rule
or decision with an unlawful discriminatory motive, each
application of that rule or decision is a new violation of the
law. In Bazemore . . . , for example, . . . the Supreme Court
properly held that each application of th[e] racially motivated
salary structure, i.e., each new paycheck constituted a distinct
violation of Title VII.266
Title VII’s back pay provision and Congress’s refusal to amend the application
of Bazemore v. Friday by the federal circuit courts and the EEOC prove that
pay discrimination cases should be decided differently than other employment
discrimination claims.267

262

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams, supra note 190, at 25.

See S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 54 (1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was the forerunner
to the 1991 Act.
263

264
See, e.g., EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ’g Co., 851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The
Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a ‘continuing violation’ [in Bazemore, where] there
was a current and continuing differential between the wages earned by black workers and those
earned by white workers.”); Berry v. Bd. of Supv. of LSU, 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th Cir. 1983) (“We
also observe that there are a number of decisions in which salary discrimination has been found
to constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, usually on the rationale that each discriminatory
paycheck violates the Act.”); Bartelt v. Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., 698 F.2d 1003, 1004-05,
n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that a disparate pay claim accrued upon making of
pay decision); Satz v. ITT Financial Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The practice of
applying discriminatorily unequal pay occurs not only when an employer sets pay levels, but as long
as the discriminatory differential continues.”).
265

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

266

S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 54 (1990).

267

See Brief for Nat’l Partn. Women & Fams., supra note 190, at 25.
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Congress Should Reinstate the “Paycheck Accrual Rule”
Justice Ginsburg ended the dissenting opinion by imploring Congress to act,
as it did in 1991, to “correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”268
Congress was listening.269 The chairman of the House Education and Labor
Committee introduced the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (the Ledbetter Act),
on June 22, 2007.270 The Ledbetter Act will negate the Court’s ruling and restore
the paycheck accrual rule introduced in Bazemore v. Friday.271
The United States House of Representatives passed the Ledbetter Act on July
30, 2007 with a vote of 215–187, largely along party lines.272 The Senate then
placed the bill on its calendar.273 If the Ledbetter Act passes the Senate, President
Bush’s advisors have recommended a veto.274
The President’s advisors cite concerns that adoption of the paycheck accrual rule
will impede justice and negate incentives to promptly resolve alleged discrimination
claims.275 The advisors also criticize the bill as essentially eliminating the statute
of limitations periods for claims such as promotion and termination, which an
employee can currently challenge only within 180-days communication.276 Such

268

Ledbetter II, 127 S. Ct. at 2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

269

H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).

270

Id.

271

Id. The Ledbetter Act proposes the following provision to Title VII:
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect
to discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes
subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision
or other practice, including each time wages, beneﬁts, or other compensation is paid,
resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.

Id. (emphasis added). The Ledbetter Act also proposes addition of this language to the Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. Id.
272

National Organization for Women, http://www.capwiz.com/now/vote.xc/?votenum=768&
chamber= H&congress=1101&voteid=10130076&state=US (last visited on Nov. 18, 2007).
273

Id.

274

Statement of Administration Policy—H.R. 2831 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, July
27, 2007.
275

Id.

276

Id.
[E]xtending the expanded statute of limitations to any ‘other practice’ that remotely
affects an individual’s wages, beneﬁts or other compensation in the future . . .
could effectively waive the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims (such
as promotion and arguably even termination decisions) traditionally regarded as
actionable only when they occur.
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arguments overreact to the language of the bill. The Ledbetter Act does not
overrule United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans and its progeny—those cases squarely stand
for a claimant’s inability to challenge a discrete act, such as hiring or ﬁring, outside
the limitations period.277

Congress Should Also Lengthen the 180-day Filing Period
Congress has taken one essential step toward remedying the harsh
consequences of Ledbetter, but it should go further.278 The root of the problem
exists with the unusually short statute of limitations.279 The Civil Rights Act of
1964 originally provided for a 90-day statute of limitations.280 The amendments
of 1972 lengthened the ﬁling period to the now current 180-days to bring it
into line with the National Labor Relations Act, which served as a template for
Title VII.281 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 proposed an extension of the statute
of limitations to two years, but Congress challenged the provision and eventually
removed it from the amendment.282 Congress must realize that an employee needs
more time to realize the discrimination, gather information to ﬁle a complaint
and ﬁnd representation.283 Statutes of limitations for many civil actions allow a
year or more to bring a claim.284 No persuasive reason exists why someone who
slips on a wet ﬂoor should have more time to assert her rights than an employee
who experiences pay discrimination.285

Impact of Ledbetter v. Goodyear
If the Ledbetter Act fails, both employers and employees will feel adverse
effects.286 Because employees encounter difﬁculty recognizing a disparate pay
277

Evans, 122 U.S. at 558 (describing Evans’s termination as “merely an unfortunate event
in history which has no present legal consequences”); Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259 (holding termination
decision must be challenged within the ﬁling period even if last day of employment did not occur
until a year later); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify. . . Morgan can only ﬁle a charge to cover
discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within the appropriate time period.”).
278

Brake & Grossman, supra note 221.

279

Id.

280

Id.

281

Id.

282

Id.

283

Brake & Grossman, supra note 221.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (iv) (2006) (allowing four years to bring an action for
trespass upon real property; injury to rights not arising on contract; and relief on the ground of
fraud). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (v) (allowing one year to bring an action for libel;
slander; malicious prosecution; false imprisonment; and assault or battery (not including sexual
assault)).
284

285

Brake & Grossman, supra note 221.

286

Hearings, supra note 2, at 3 (testimony of Prof. Deborah Brake).
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claim and the ﬁling period ends quickly, time will bar most legitimate claims.287
If an employee cannot challenge her paycheck as discriminatory, illegal acts by
employers will be legitimized once the 180-day ﬁling period expires.288 Workers’
base salaries often inform pension and social security payments; therefore,
unchallenged pay discrimination will continue to affect workers well after they no
longer work for an employer.289
The Ledbetter decision also exacerbates the gender-wage gap.290 This effect
is particularly bleak for Wyoming, where the high gender-wage gap already
discourages women from settling in the state.291 The Ledbetter Act will undo
the damage of the decision, helping to reduce the wage gap and beneﬁt both
employers and employees.292 Employee turnover would likely decrease, resulting
in lower training and recruiting costs.293 The number of welfare and medical
beneﬁts would also likely decline, beneﬁting state and federal governments as
well.294
The Ledbetter Court insisted on protecting defendants from stale claims.295
Many who support the decision view it as a victory for employers.296 Employers,
however, are not served well by the impacts of the judgment.297 The ruling
creates incentives for employees to ﬁle EEOC claims early and often to preserve
any potential challenges.298 The decision also encourages employees who
fear retaliation to ﬁle their claims without ﬁrst informing their employers.299
Employees now must frequently investigate the wages of other employees, so as
not to sit on their rights.300 Such results do not promote a friendly workplace or
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trusting environment.301 These consequences do not advance the Title VII goal of
voluntary conciliation.302

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, starts the “clock”
of statutory limitations far too soon for most reasonable employees to learn
of discriminatory pay decisions.303 According to the Court, once an employer
informs an employee of each pay decision, even a raise, she must “rock the
boat” by immediately investigating colleagues’ ﬁnances and ﬁling a claim with
the EEOC.304 This interpretation does not eliminate discrimination.305 In fact,
rather than relying on Title VII’s protections, those in a protected class must
now choose between hyper-vigilance and losing the chance to ever remedy pay
discrimination.306
In the past, the circuit courts and the EEOC followed the “paycheck accrual
rule” articulated in Bazemore v. Friday, allowing employees to challenge each
paycheck as an independent employment act.307 When Congress set out to restore
the power of Title VII in 1991, it could easily have disagreed with this interpretation
and clariﬁed its position on the “paycheck accrual rule.”308 It did not.309 Still,
the Ledbetter Court chose even-handed administration over restoring victims of
discrimination.310 The Court emphasized that because Goodyear implemented a
facially non-discriminatory pay system, the company did not discriminate with
each paycheck it issued.311 The Court legitimized Goodyear’s bias simply because
the company was wise enough not to discriminate overtly.312
Congress has taken the right step in introducing the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
but discovery and tolling issues remain.313 Also the presidential veto threat could
jeopardize the protections Congress has struggled to provide for decades.314 It
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remains the duty of Congress to push zealously for legislation ensuring victims
of disparate pay receive compensation and to deter future discrimination by
employers.315

315

See supra notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
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